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EDSON R. SUNDERLAND AND THE TEACHING
OF PROCEDURE
Charles H. King*

having arrived at the University of Michigan Law School,
Edson Sunderland never left, except on a temporary basis.
He entered the school in 1898, having previously received his
Bachelor's and Master's degrees from the University's College of
Literature, Science and the Arts. Immediately upon his graduation in 1901 he was invited to become a member of the faculty,
an invitation which he accepted effective the following fall.
That Professor Sunderland chose to stay in Ann Arbor was
a felicitous turn of events, in more ways than one. It was a happy
choice for him, since it made possible spending the rest of his four
score and five doing what he loved to do, in a place where he loved
to do it. He loved Ann Arbor. He loved the University and in
particular the Law School. He loved the teaching of law and the
prodigious research that went with it. But, above all, he loved
the hundreds and hundreds of students who over the years were
privileged to sit in his classes.
Professor Sunderland's decision to stay in Ann Arbor was an
equally happy choice for the Law School. More than the bricks
and mortar of Haven and Hutchins Halls, he was one of the pillars
upon which the tremendous prestige and nation-wide reputation of
the law school came to be built. When a lawyer looks back to
his law school days, he instinctively tends to remember first the
teacher who made the deepest and most lasting impression upon
him. For Michigan graduates of the years when he was still there,
the odds are long that such initial remembrance will be of Professor Sunderland.
The chief beneficiaries of Professor Sunderland's long stay in
Ann Arbor were his many students. To them was afforded the
opportunity of studying an extremely difficult and highly technical subject under the tutelage of an acknowledged master of his
craft. Of even greater value was the privilege of knowing him personally. For thousands of young men and women, many of them
today's leaders of their chosen profession, this was a rewarding
and inspiring experience. The clarity and conciseness of his
thought, the lucidity and directness of his expression and the
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sprightliness of his humor were surpassed only by his kindliness
and sympathetic understanding. Here truly was a "gentleman of
the old school."
To say that Professor Sunderland was a great teacher is easy;
to explain what made him so is not. What makes a good law
teacher is difficult if not impossible of definition. It depends on
the impact he makes upon his students, and unfortunately all law
students do not respond in the same way to the same stimuli. The
object, of course, is to generate in the student an intellectual curiosity concerning the subject at hand and to stimulate him to satisfy
that curiosity to the best of his ability. How this may best be done
is a question to which there is no simple answer. Some teachers
do it by acerbity and some by lucidity. Others do it by exhortation
and some by exasperation, the latter technique being usually described as putting a burr under the student's blanket.
Professor Sunderland accomplished his results, I think, by inspiration. Here was a man who was a recognized authority in his
field, a fact which became immediately obvious to any student
who even so much as glanced at the footnotes to his casebook. They
were replete with references to the professor's own published writings on the subject.
In class, his mastery of the subject became even more apparent.
So did his capacity to expound it in logical and understandable
fashion. Coupled with this was a friendly eagerness to be helpfula never-failing willingness to lend a hand over the rough spots
of a discipline both difficult and esoteric. Rare indeed would be
the student who by such a teacher would not be inspired to do his
very best.
Professor Sunderland's first assignment at the law school was
to supervise the work of the Practice Court, first established at
Michigan in 1893, and a project which always remained close to
his heart. Such courts were rare then but are commonplace today,
largely as a result of the development and expansion of the one at
Michigan under the supervision of Professor Sunderland.
At least during his first year, Professor Sunderland devoted
all of his time to the work of the Practice Court. But he soon began teaching some of the traditional procedural courses, probably
Common Law Pleading to begin with. Whether this assignment
to him of courses in pleading and practice was a matter of his
choice or whether, as the newest member of the faculty, he was
"stuck" with them is not a matter of record. That the latter may
have been true is indicated by the fact that for the first five years
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or so of his teaching career, his published writings dealt with other
than procedural matters. It was not until 1909, when he wrote the
chapters of "Cyc" dealing with Pleading and Process, that he began
the long series of books and articles which were to have such a
tremendous impact on American procedural law.
In any case, he became enraptured of the subject and stayed
with it all his life, with probably more influence, both through
his students and through his published writings and other activities, than any other lawyer or law teacher of his time. He was
perhaps the first American teacher of procedure who refused to
believe that next to the Bible the greatest book in the English
language was Chitty on Pleading.
Very early in his teaching career, Professor Sunderland came
to a very simple conclusion concerning the purpose of legal education, a conclusion which today would cause him in many quarters
to be branded as old-fashioned. "[T]he chief function of a law
school," he wrote in 1903, "is to fit men for the practice of the
law."1 In 1914, he reiterated that the task of a law school "is to
train men to do well the technical work expected from their profession. It looks to skillful performance in certain lines of activity. The test of its success is the efficiency of its output. . .. The
law school does not justify its existence by contending that a legally
trained mind makes a good citizen, though that may be entirely
true. It justifies itself by asserting that the country needs welltrained lawyers and by showing that it can produce them." 2
As the years went by, a considerable expansion took place in
Professor Sunderland's ideas and concepts concerning the proper
function of legal education. He came to recognize, and perhaps
was one of the first to do so, that there was more to a great law
school, or even a good one, than simply equipping its graduates
with the specialized information and technical skills essential to
success in the performance of their professional function. As
president, in 1930, of the Association of American Law Schools,
he urged that the schools contribute to "the development and
understanding of a science of law" and be leaders in "making the
law more responsive to social needs." 3
Sunderland, "The Practice Court," 9 MICH • .ALUMNUS 295 (1903).
Sunderland, "The Teaching of Practice and Procedure in Law Schools," 12 MICH. L
REv. 185 at 189 (1914).
8 Sunderland, "The Law Schools and the Legal Profession," 5 TULANE L. REv. 337 at
341, 339 (1931).
1

2
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Parenthetically, Professor Sunderland was one of the three
Michigan faculty members who have been honored by election to
the presidency of the Association of American Law Schools. For an
additional year, he served on its executive committee.
There is no question, however, that the intense practicality
of Professor Sunderland's early ideas about teaching law in general greatly colored his original approach to the teaching of procedure in particular. On one occasion he wrote, "The lawyer is
essentially a practitioner, and the schools must therefore aim to
do what they can to prepare men for practice."4 On another occasion, he said that "the law schools, in order to fully fill the place
for which they have been created and maintained, should give their
students a complete preparation for all that the practice of the
profession will afterwards demand of them." 5
It was not until 1915, with the publication of an article decrying the disability of most American trial judges to assist juries
in the performance of their function by the expression of comments on the evidence, the testimony and character of witnesses,
that Professor Sunderland is found to be changing from a teacher
of what legal procedure is to an advocate of what it ought to be.
A few years later another concept appears, that the teaching of
procedure should not only train men for the practice of their
profession and to be leaders in the improvement of judicial administration, but should also be a vehicle for imparting to the
student a greater sense of his future professional responsibility.
This idea bore fruit in his Cases on Judicial Administration, published in 1937, a considerable portion of which is devoted to the
professional status and responsibility of the attorney.
When Professor Sunderland first joined the faculty at Michigan, the coverage of procedure in the curricula of most law schools
was usually restricted to two courses, one in pleading and the other
in evidence, with sometimes a course in equity practice thrown in.
The course in pleading seldom went beyond a study of the forms
of action and the declarations, demurrers, pleas and replications
of the common law. The_ surface of code pleading had hardly
been scratched, a course in trial practice was unheard of and only
a few schools had moot or practice courts of any consequence.
Forty-three years later, when he retired from active teaching,
Sunderland, "The Art of Legal Practice," 18 MICH. ALUMNUS 252 at 256 (1912).
Sunderland, "The Teaching of Practice and Procedure in Law Schools,'' 12 MICH. L.
REv. 185 at 189 (1914).
4
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the share of the curriculum devoted to the study of procedure
in its various aspects had in all American law schools been greatly
expanded. Using Michigan as an example, many law schools now
require courses in Introduction to Law and Equity, Jurisdiction
and Judgments, Pleading and J oinder, and Evidence. These are
supplemented by voluntary but virtually universal participation
in a moot court program conducted under the auspices of the
so-called Case Clubs, followed by a faculty supervised Practice
Court, the first part of which is in reality a classroom course in
Trial Practice. Harvard Law School, for another example, lists
courses in Civil Procedure, Equitable Remedies, Evidence, Federal Courts and Trial Practice. In addition, there is practice court
work for first year students under the supervision of the teaching
fellows, as well as the moot court programs of the law clubs.
These latter are followed in the second year by the Ames Competition.
Without question much of this giving to the subject of procedure a greater slice of the curricular pie has been the result of
Professor Sunderland's exhortations to that end. As early as 1914,
he was complaining that the law schools considered procedural
courses as an "unscholarly necessity - a form of surrender to popular demands. " 6 On the contrary, according to him, "procedure,
when rightly considered, is the very life of the law."7
"I take it to be clear," he wrote, "that the professional equipment of the lawyer ought to include a reasonable familiarity with
the fundamental rules under which remedies are obtained in the
courts. And it follows that the law schools, which are established
to prepare lawyers for professional work, ought to do what is reasonably possible to give them the necessary training in the principles of procedure. " 8
To this end, he vigorously advocated that the law curriculum
should include not only common law pleading and evidence but
further courses in modern or code pleading, trial practice and
appellate procedure, all to be followed by work in a practice court
which would serve as a "summation or integration of the other
branches. ''9
Today, in virtually every American law school, what Professor
6Id.
7 Id.
s Id.
9 Id.

at
at
at
at

197.
187.
189.
197.
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Sunderland thus hopefully advocated has practically become the
accepted minimum of coverage that should be given to procedural
subjects.
He was never one merely to advocate an idea; his dynamic
nature required that he do something about it as well. The result
was a series of casebooks which, if they had all been published,
would have embraced each of the subjects which Professor Sunderland set forth as necessary to supply a lawyer with his basic procedural needs. The first was his Cases on Trial Practice, published
in 1912. This was followed in successive years by his Cases on
Code Pleading and Cases on Common Law Pleading. The flyleaves of these books indicate that there were more to come, on
Equity Pleading and Practice, Criminal Procedure, Appellate
Practice and Evidence, but with the exception of Appellate Practice, which was subsequently combined with Trial Practice into
a single volume, these other projected volumes never appeared.
The probable reason for this was that, as the faculty at Michigan
expanded, the courses in Equity, Criminal Law and Evidence were
assigned to other teachers, who produced their own casebooks.
When Professor Sunderland's Cases on Trial Practice was
published in 1913, that subject had not theretofore been included
in the curriculum of any American law school. To him, this was
a grave omission which needed correction, for the reason that
"the trial is the end and essence of procedure. It is the center
about which all other procedure subjects revolve. To really
understand the trial is to understand procedure. The pleadings
lead up to it, the evidence is part and parcel of it, the appeal grows
out of it."10
Professor Sunderland attributed the curricular neglect of Trial
Practice to two causes: one, "the failure to clearly distinguish
between trial practice as a body of well defined and accurately
developed principles of procedure and trial practice as a vague
and shadowy discourse on success in advocacy,"11 and the other
"the prevalent idea that trial practice is essentially local in its close
dependence on statutes and court rules."12
His Cases on Trial Practice demonstrated that neither of these
causes for neglecting the subject were valid, especially the latter.
"[T]here is no subject of the law," he wrote, "either in procedure
10 Id. at

191.
192.
12 Id. at 193.
11 Id. at
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or the substantive branches, where there is less diversity in fundamentals and in the principles of interpretation than in the trial
practice. " 13
As a result of Professor Sunderland's pioneering in the area,
Trial Practice eventually became a standard item in the curriculum of practically every law school in the country. Naturally,
other casebooks appeared but his continued to set the basic pattern for the course and to enjoy a widespread popularity, so much
so that the book went through three editions.
To mention again the good fortune of Professor Sunderland's
long stay at Ann Arbor, it seems not amiss to note that Callaghan
and Company must have enjoyed a goodly share of it. They published all of his casebooks, which, including the several editions,
numbered an even ten. It must have been an eminently satisfactory arrangement for both parties.
What really was a second edition of Professor Sunderland's
Cases on Trial Practice was not published as such. Rather the
title was changed to Cases on Trial and Appellate Practice, to reflect the inclusion in the book of a substantial body of materials
dealing with the latter aspect of procedure. Here was another
teaching innovation. Until this book appeared in 1924, the subject of appellate practice had been completely omitted from law
school curricula, for largely the same reasons that prevailed twelve
years earlier in respect to Trial Practice. Again, Professor Sunderland demonstrated that the subject was readily susceptible to law
school teaching, with the result that, while its inclusion in law
school curricula may not be universal, at least it is covered in most
of the better schools.
A later edition contained still another innovation-the inclusion of a section on judgments. Except as their validity from a
jurisdictional standpoint was touched upon in courses in Conflicts of Law, the subject of Judgments was another that theretofore had been ignored by the law schools. Yet, as he said, "The
judgment is one of the most vital features of our system of litigation . . . [ e]mbodying as it does the final result of the entire
· d"1c1·al process .... "14
JU
Here, then, are a few of Professor Sunderland's many contributions to the teaching of procedure. In his own classes, he
contributed mightily to the professional proficiency of his students.
13 Ibid.
14 SUNDERLAND,

CASF.5

ON TRIAL AND APPELLATE

PRACI'ICE, 2d ed., iii (1941).
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Through them, he helped awaken the bar to a greater sense of
professional responsibility and to the continuing need for improvement in judicial administration. He brought the subject
of procedure out of the curricular closet and gained for it an expanded and honored place at the table of legal education. Through
his work with the Practice Court at Michigan he gave impetus
to the establishment and development of similar programs at
many other schools. Because of him, more than a generation of
lawyers, while still in law school, received formal training in the
fundamental principles which govern the trial of lawsuits. Many
of them, also because of him, received additional training in appellate practice and in the law of judgments.
To conclude on a personal note, I recall that while doing graduate work at Ann Arbor under Professor Sunderland's direction
I once took my partially completed thesis to his office, for him
to look over. Responding to a criticism by him of the lack of
clarity in a particular passage, I made the same excuse that surely
every law teacher has heard a hundred times over, especially at
examination time, that I had in my head what I was trying to say
but was having difficulty getting it down on paper. I was brought
up short by the comment that such could not be the case, that if I
couldn't get it straight on paper then I didn't have it straight in
my mind. I've never forgotten that lesson; neither shall I ever
forget the great and fine man who taught it to me.

